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GAME-THEORETIC LEARNING AND ALLOCATIONS IN ROBUST1
DYNAMIC COALITIONAL GAMES∗2
M. SMYRNAKIS † , D. BAUSO ‡ , AND H. TEMBINE §3
Abstract. The problem of allocation in coalitional games with noisy observations and dynamic4
environments is considered. The evolution of the excess is modelled by a stochastic differential5
inclusion involving both deterministic and stochastic uncertainties. The main contribution is a6
set of linear matrix inequality conditions which guarantee that the distance of any solution of the7
stochastic differential inclusions from a predefined target set is second-moment bounded. As a direct8
consequence of the above result we derive stronger conditions still in the form of linear matrix9
inequalities to hold in the entire state space, which guarantee second-moment boundedness. Another10
consequence of the main result are conditions for convergence almost surely to the target set, when the11
Brownian motion vanishes in proximity of the set. As further result we prove convergence conditions12
to the target set of any solution to the stochastic differential equation if the stochastic disturbance13
has bounded support. We illustrate the results on a simulated intelligent mobility scenario involving14
a transport network.15
Key words. Coalitional Games, Transferable Utility (TU), Second-moment boundedness, In-16
telligent mobility network, Robust control.17
AMS subject classifications. 68Q25, 68R10, 68U0518
1. Introduction. The theory of coalitional games with transferable utility stud-19
ies stable allocations for groups of agents who decide to cooperate (Osborne, 2004;20
Shapley, 1953; Aumann et al., 1960; Schmeidler, 1969; Aumann, 1961; Luce and Raiffa,21
1957; Maschelr et al., 1979). Cooperation materializes in different forms such as shar-22
ing facilities, sharing costs, placing joint bids. Coalitional games arise in many areas23
such as: communication networks (Saad et al., 2009), smart grids (Saad et al., 2012),24
reconfigurable robotics (Ramaekers et al., 2011), swarm robotics (Cheng et al., 2008),25
multi-robot task allocation (Bayram et al., 2016).26
A research area where coalitional games are an active topic is robust control27
(Bauso and Timmer, 2012; Wada and Fujisaki , 2017; Fele et al. , 2017). A widely used28
approach to solve robust control problems, (Bauso , 2017; Garud , 2005; Bauso et al.29
, 2015), is approachabilitty theorem (Blackwell , 1956). In Lehrer (2003), Blackwell’s30
approachability theorem was used in order to analyse an allocation process based31
on coalitional games. Another technique which has been used in order to analyse32
game-theoretic learning algorithms is stochastic approximation. In his seminal pepar33
Benaim et al. (2005) showed that stochastic approximation methods can be seen as34
a continuous asymptotic version of approachability theorem. Based on this result in35
this article stochastic approximation methods are used in order to analyse coallitional36
games.37
The results we provide collocate within the learning, control and optimisation38
research areas. This research direction finds applications in various problems such as39
wind energy (Opathella and Venkatesh , 2013; Bayens et al. , 2013), and the inventory40
control problem Bauso et al. (2008); Bauso et al. (2010).41
In accordance with the classification provided in (Saad et al., 2009), this paper42
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answers most of the questions arising in canonical coalitional games with transferable43
utility (TU) within the framework of robust stabilizability. The underlying idea is44
that the cooperative agents, now viewed as players, form a coalition which includes all45
players, namely the grand coalition and need to reach agreement on how to redistribute46
the reward deriving from forming such a grand coalition in a way that makes the grand47
coalition stable. Stability is generally linked to the possibility of allocating to each48
sub-coalition a quantity greater than the reward itself that the sub-coalition could49
guarantee for itself without coalizing with the rest of the players (players outside50
that sub-coalition). When this occurs, we say that no players or subsets of players51
gain from quitting the grand coalition. This corresponds to saying that the excess,52
namely the difference between the allocated rewards and the value of the coalition53
is non-negative. In the broad context of coalitional games, consider the possibility54
that the reward of a coalition is divided among the players of the coalitions. By value55
of the coalition we mean the reward produced by that coalition. The procedure to56
allocate the reward which needs to be agreed by the players, constitutes the so-called57
allocation rule. Under the assumption that the values of the coalitions are time-58
varying and uncertain, and the allocation process occurs continuously in time, the59
resulting game is called robust coalitional game. Such a game was first formulated by60
(Bauso and Timmer, 2009, 2012). The evolution of the excesses is also captured by a61
fluid flow system of the type discussed in (Bauso et al., 2010).62
The contribution of this paper is three-fold. We first formulate the problem of63
allocation in TU games with noisy observations and dynamic environments. In the64
considered scenario the evolution of the excess is subjected to both deterministic65
and stochastic uncertainty. The resulting dynamics can be expressed in the form66
of a stochastic differential inclusion, involving also a Brownian motion. For this67
game, as main result we provide conditions which guarantee that the distance of68
any solution of the stochastic differential inclusion from a predefined target set is69
second-moment bounded. We show that these conditions can take the form of a70
linear matrix inequality to be verified in different regions of the state space (Boyd et71
al., 1994, Chapter 6). As direct consequence of the above result we derive stronger72
conditions still in the form of linear matrix inequalities to hold in the entire state73
space, which guarantee second-moment boundedness. Further to the above main74
result we provide conditions for convergence almost surely to the target set, when the75
influence of the Brownian motion vanishes with decreasing distance from the set. The76
resulting dynamics mimics a geometric Brownian motion. As further result we prove77
convergence conditions to the target set of any solution to the stochastic differential78
equation if the stochastic disturbance has bounded support.79
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces preliminaries80
on coalitional games. Section 4 discusses the model and states the problem. Section 581
links the model to saturated control and population game dynamics. Section 6 in-82
cludes the main results of the paper. Section 7 specializes the model to an intelligent83
mobility scenario. Section 8 contains numerical examples. Finally, Section 9 provides84
conclusions and future works.85
2. Preliminaries on TU games. This section overviews coalitional games with86
transferable utility (TU). Let a set N = {1, . . . , n} of players be given and a function87
η : S 7→ R defined for each non-empty coalition S ∈ S, where S is the set of all88
possible non-empty coalitions, with cardinality |S| = 2n − 1. We denote by < N, η >89
the TU game with players set N and characteristic function η, which quantifies the90
gain of coalition S.91
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Let us introduce some arbitrary mapping of S into M := {1, . . . , q} where q =92
2n− 1, is the number of non-empty coalitions, namely, the cardinality of S. Denote a93
generic element of M by j. In other words, we can see j standing for the labelling of94
the jth element of S, say Sj , according to some arbitrary but fixed ordering. Let the95
grand coalition be denoted by N . Furthermore, let ηj be the value of the characteristic96
function η associated with a non-empty coalition Sj ∈ S.97
Given a TU game, we wish first to investigate if the grand coalition is stable, i.e.98
if it is possible for the players to get better rewards by choosing a smaller coalition.99
A partial answer to the above question lies in the concept of imputation set. The100
imputation set I(η) is the set of allocations that are101
• efficient, that is, the sum of the components of the allocation vector is equal102
to the value of the grand coalition, and103
• individually rational, namely there is no individual which is benefited, increase104
his reward, by splitting from the grand coalition and playing alone.105
More formally, the imputation set is a convex polyhedron defined as:
Iη = {u˜ ∈ Rn|
Efficiency︷ ︸︸ ︷∑
i∈N
u˜i = ηN , u˜i ≥ ηSi , ∀ni ∈ S ′︸ ︷︷ ︸
individual rationality
},
where u˜i is the reward allocated to player i, N here represents the grand coalition106
where all the players participate, S ′ is the set of all coalitions which consist of a single107
player and ηSj is the gain of coalition Sj .108
A stronger solution concept than the imputation set is the core. Given any al-109
location in the core, the players do not benefit from not only quitting the grand110
coalition and playing alone, but also from creating any sub-coalition. In this sense111
the core strengthens the conditions valid for the imputation set. Thus the core is still112
a polyhedral set which is included in the imputation set.113
Definition 2.1. The core of a game 〈N, u〉 is the set of allocations that satisfy
i) efficiency, ii) individual rationality, and iii) super-additivity, i.e. stability with
respect to sub-coalitions:
Cη = {u˜ ∈ I(η)|
∑
i∈Sj
u˜i ≥ ηSj ,∀Sj ∈ S︸ ︷︷ ︸
stability w.r.t. subcoalitons
}.
Even though the core is a fundamental concept in coalitional games, it is not114
necessary that the core will be a non-empty set. Two broad categories of coalitional115
games with non-empty core are: convex (Shapley, 1971) and balanced games (Bon-116
dareva, 1963; Shapley, 1967).117
Definition 2.2. A coalitional game < N, η > is convex if the following inequality
is satisfied.
ηSi + ηSj ≤ ηSi∩Sj + ηSi∪Sj ,∀Si, Sj ⊂ N.
Definition 2.3. A coalitional game < N, η > is balanced if for any balanced map
α we have: ∑
j∈S
αSjηSj ≤ ηN .
This manuscript is for review purposes only.
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In order to overcome the problem of an empty core in (Shapley and Shubik, 1966)118
the notion of -core was introduced119
Definition 2.4. For a real number  the -core is defined as:
Cη = {u˜ ∈ I(η)|
∑
i∈Sj
u˜i ≥ ηSj − ,∀Sj ∈ S}.
In order to assess stability of the grand coalition, the core, both its value ηN , and120
the reward allocated to each player is needed. Therefore, there is a need to define121
an allocation mechanism of the coalition’s rewards among the players. One of the122
most used allocation mechanisms is the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953, 1971). An123
additional reason for choosing Shapley’s value is its connection with feedback control124
and uncertainty as it was shown in (Bauso and Timmer, 2012)125





|Sj |!(|N | − |Sj | − 1)!
|N |! (ηSj∪{i} − ηSj ).
The Shapley value can be interpreted as the expected weighted contribution of126
player i when it joins the grand coalition in a random order.127
3. Motivating example. Various applications of the TU games have been con-128
sidered in literature. Examples include Market games (Shapley and Shubic, 1969),129
public good games (Bodwin, 2017), the bankruptcy problem (Aumann and Maschler,130
1985) and inventory problems (Chinchuluun et al., 2008). Applications which com-131
bine TU games with optimisation and learning include micro-grid problems (Saad et132
al. , 2013) and coordinated replenishment (Bauso and Timmer, 2009).133
The case study which is considered in this article, the intelligent mobility network134
application, falls in the category of the inventory problems. Players should decide if135
it is more beneficial to create a coalition and share the cost of the inventory or it is136
better to bear the cost alone.137
Intelligent mobility deals with the smart transport of items, goods or individuals138
from source to destination nodes using shared facilities like buses, trams, electric139
vehicles. Suppose that items are initially stored in the supply centre indexed by 0140
and need to be transported to different destination centres generically indexed by i,141
i = 1, . . . , n. Destination centres are characterized by a time-varying demand which142
is independent identically distributed across time and centres.143
Note here that the capacitate vehicle routing problem is usually solved in two144
parts. In the first one the assignment problem is solved, i.e. one makes decisions145
about the sites that should be visited. In the second part the optimal route is found146
through traveller salesman algorithms for example. In this article we focus on the147
first part, where the network topology is not playing a significant role. The manager148
of destination center i bids the quantity to be transported from the supply center149
and terminating in center i based on his forecast of the future demand. Managers150
can collaborate and place joint bids with the advantage of compensating potential151
fluctuation of the their demand. This can be represented using a graph and a cycle,152
namely, a closed path with source and destination in node zero, see for instance the153
three transport cycles originating from and terminating in 0 and touching destination154
centres {1, 2, 3}, {4}, and {5, . . . , 9} in the network of Figure 1(a).155
This manuscript is for review purposes only.











(a) Three transport cycles originating from and terminat-
ing in 0 and touching destination centers {1, 2, 3}, {4},











(b) One transport cycle originating from and terminat-
ing in 0 and touching all destination centers.
Fig. 1. Example of a distribution network
When all managers act jointly, we say that they form a grand coalition. In such156
case a single cycle will touch all destination centres as described by the transport157
cycle originating from and terminating in 0 and touching all destination centres in158
Figure 1(b).159
In stable environments, in cases where the cost function of players is deterministic,160
and it possible to obtain observations without noise the conventional analysis of TU161
games can be applied, i.e. results about the existence of the core, or the evaluation162
of nucleus or Shapley’s value.163
In particular, consider the scenario where N = {1, . . . , n} be the set of receiving
centres. For each coalition S ∈ S, let DS be a random variable representing the
aggregate demand faced by that coalition. Let us assume that DS has continuous
probability density function f(DS). In other words, the probability that the aggregate
demand is between a and b is




The continuous cumulative distribution function (CDF) is F (b), and represents the
probability that the aggregate demand is less than or equal to b:




Let Θ be the order quantity, p in R+ be the sale price, s in R+ be the penalty164
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price for shortage, when demand exceeds supply, and let h in R+ be the penalty price165
for holding, when supply exceeds demand.166
Introduce the stock variable ZS = Θ−DS . Denote the indicator function by167
(1) IR+(ZS) =
{
1 if ZS ∈ R+
0 otherwise.
168
Then, the expected profit for the generic coalition S ∈ S under the order quantity169
Θ is given by170
(2) 〈PS(DS ,Θ)〉 = E
[
pmin(Θ, DS)− cΘ − [sIR+(ZS)− hIR+(−ZS)]|ZS |
]
.171
In the above we express the expected profit as function of the expected shortage and172



















We can then rewrite the expected profit as175
(4)


































where 〈ys〉 is the mean demand and is given by
∫∞
0
f(DS)DS dDS . The problem faced180
by the coalition is the one of maximizing the expected profit with respect to the order181














Assuming concavity of 〈PS(DS ,Θ)〉 the optimal order quantity Θ∗ is obtained by184
computing the derivative of 〈PS(DS ,Θ)〉 with respect to Θ and taking it equal to185

















we can rewrite the expected profit as189
〈PS(DS ,Θ)〉 = p〈DS〉 − cΘ
−sΘ ∫ Θ
0
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Then for the derivative we have191
d
dC (〈PS(DS ,Θ)〉)
= −c− s ∫ Θ
0




f(DS) dDS − (p+ h)Θf(Θ) + (p+ h)Θf(Θ)
= −c− s ∫ Θ
0




= −c− sF (Θ) + (p+ h)[1− F (Θ)],
192
where F is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of y. The optimal order193
quantity is given by:194




Let F−1 be the inverse function of F then it holds196






Then, the optimal expected profit is198
(7)
























where we denote by E∗h the expected surplus under the optimal order quantity Θ
∗
S .200
Consider a sequence of sampling intervals indexed by k = 0, 1, . . .. We build on201
the results for the optimal order quantity (6) and expected profit (7), which we have202
obtained above. We assume that the demand at interval k has a Normal distribution203
with mean DS(k − 1) and variance σ2:204
(8) DS(k)−DS(k − 1) ∼ N (0, σ2).205
We can rewrite the optimal order quantity in terms of the number of standard
deviations away from the mean:
Θ∗S = DS(k − 1) + k∗σ,
where k has standard Normal distribution. Denote by Φ(k) the CDF of a standard





To obtain (6) from (5), we introduced the inverse function F−1. We follow the same
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(DS − k)f(DS) dDS .
Then, from (7) the optimal expected profit is206
〈PS(DS ,Θ∗S)〉 = pµ− c(DS(k − 1) + k∗σ)
−s[k∗σ + σG(k∗)]− (p+ h)σG(k∗)
= pµ− cyk−1−σ(c+ s)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
k∗−σ(s+ p+ h)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
G(k∗).207
Note that the expected profit decreases with the standard deviation σ, namely, the208
volatility of the demand.209
Coalition games that are subject to probabilistic demand/ characteristic function,210
as in the aforementioned example, have been also studied in the context of stochastic211
cooperative games (Suijs et al., 1997; Toriello and Nelson, 2017). In that context212
conditions for a stable core were devised. Similarly the news agent problem (Muller213
et al., 2002; Hartman and Dror, 2005; Slikker et al., 2005) is a coalition problem where214
probabilistic utilities emerge. The literature concerning this problem also focuses on215
conditions for non-empty core and fair allocations.216
In the current article a different approach is adopted. The control of the stochastic217
process in order to be bounded around the core is considered, instead of trying to218
define suitable conditions for the core of the game to be non-empty. As a result a219
formulation of TU games with dynamically changing characteristic function, which220
allows its representation as a stochastic process is provided. A saturated controller is221
used in order for the process to be bounded around the core. The proposed controller222
resembles the “Best response” decision making process. Hence, stochastic differential223
inclusions emerge from the control process. Therefore, analysis of a stochastic process224
which can be occured through the TU game formulation is provided, based on the225
theory of stochastic differential inclusions Benaim et al. (2005).226
Since the cost function is not constant throughout the game any more and in each227
time step of the decision making process a fluctuated version of the cost function is228
available because either of changes in the environment or noisy observations. This229
analysis focuses on the control of the outcome of the stochastic process either to be230
in the core or bounded in the -core based on the volatility of the perturbations.231
4. Model and problem statement. This section is separated into two parts.232
The fist contains the description of the dynamic TU model and provides an illustrative233
example of a 3-player game. The second part contains the representation of the234
dynamic TU game as a stochastic process and a proposed control strategy which235
allows an a solution bounded in the e-core of the dynamic TU-game. The distance 236
from the core depends on the volatility of the stochastic process.237
4.1. TU Games with noisy observations. A dynamic TU game is described238
by < N, η(t) >, where η(t) is a time-varying characteristic function representing the239
values of different coalitions. In real life applications there are many uncontrollable240
processes which introduce uncertainty either on the rewards of the coalitional games241
or the observations of the other players’ decisions. In the intelligent mobility network242
problem, of the previous section, managers can have an estimate of the ordering243
capacities of the other managers. This estimate can be of the form of a probability244
distribution which changes over time. Therefore, the uncertainty can be modelled as245
a stochastic process.246
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It possible to represent a dynamic TU game in Matrix form. In addition, fol-247
lowing the dynamic programming paradigm, all the constraints which arise from248
the definition of the core can be represented as inequalities. In particular, let BH249
be a ((q − 1) × n)-matrix whose rows are the characteristic vectors ySj ∈ Rn of250
each coalition other than the grand coalition, i.e., Sj ∈ S, Sj 6= N . In other words251
BH = {(ySj )T }Sj∈S, Sj 6=N .252
The characteristic vectors are in turn binary vectors representing the participation253
or not of a player i in the coalition Sj , whereby y
Sj
i = 1 if i ∈ Sj and ySji = 0 if i /∈ Sj .254
For any allocation in the core of the game C(η(t)) we have:255
u˜(t) ∈ C(η(t)) ⇔ BHu˜(t) ≥ η(t),(9)256257
where the inequality is to be interpreted component-wise, and for the grand coalition258
it is satisfied with equality due to the efficiency condition of the core, i.e,
∑n
i=1 u˜i(t) =259








∈ { − 1, 0, 1}q×n+(q−1).263
Inequality (9) can be rewritten as an equality by using an augmented allocation264




] ∈ Rn+q−1 where s is a vector of q − 1 non-negative surplus265
variables. Then, we have266
(11) Bu(t) = η(t).267










−1 0 0 0 0 0
0 −1 0 0 0 0
0 0 −1 0 0 0
0 0 0 −1 0 0
0 0 0 0 −1 0
0 0 0 0 0 −1






























Remark Note here that in general TU coalitional games, as well as the formulation268
which is proposed in this article, suffer from the curse of dimensionality. In particular,269
the dimensionality of B will exponentially increase with the number of players and270
possible actions. In that case a distributed solution as the one in (Nedich and Bauso271
, 2013) can be used in order to cluster the problem to smaller sub-problems which are272
feasible to be solved.273
4.2. TU games as a stochastic process. Let us assume that the perturba-274
tions of the characteristic function are bounded in an ellipsoid. Let w(t) denote the275
perturbed observation of the players at time t, w0(t) being the time-varying charac-276
teristic function and w˜(t) the perturbation term, such as a bias in the estimator of the277
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characteristic function w0(t). In the case of an additive perturbation term the drift278
from w0(t) can be expressed as w(t) = [w0(t) + w˜(t)]. The analysis of the dynamic279
TU games which follows in the rest of this article is based on the assumption that the280
perturbations are bounded in an ellipsoid, i.e w(t) can be written as:281
(12) w(t) ∈ W = {w ∈ Rq : wTRw ≤ 1}.282
The changes in the characteristic function as they are realised by the players can be283
written then as284
(13) dη(t) = w(t)dt− ΣdB(t), in Rq,285
where ΣdB(t) is a random noise with zero mean and Σ = diag((Σii)i=1,...,q) ∈ Rq×q286
for given scalars Σii, all full column rank, and B(t) ∈ Rq is a q-dimensional Brownian287
motion, which is independent across its components, independent of the initial state288
η0, and independent across time.289
Instead of studying the evolution of the characteristic function in order to solve a
TU game the surpluses sj can be studied. Note that the difference between the allo-






A positive value for sj(t) can be interpreted as a debit for the coalition, whereas290
a negative value can be interpreted as a credit. The main insight is that if all the291
surpluses are non-negative, then the total allocation to any coalition exceeds the value292
of the coalition itself and the allocation vector lies in the core. Also, note that there293
are only q−1 surplus variables because coalition N has no surplus (∑i∈N u˜i−ηq = 0)294
due to the efficiency condition of the core.295
Let x(t) ∈ Rq, denote the cumulative excess which is obtained as follows. In296
essence, every component of vector Bu(t) is the total reward given to the members297
of a coalition at time t, and the drift from this reward, w(t), is subtracted. Then, a298
positive x(t) means positive cumulative excess.299
Let us denote the controler in linear state feedback form as:300
(14) u(x) = K(x, t)x,301
where K(x, t) ∈ co{K(i)}i∈I .302
Then the problem of stabilising the core can be cast as a problem of solving the303
following stochastic differential inclusion:304
(15) dx(t) ∈ F (x)dt+ ΣdB(t).305
Also,306
(16)
F (x) := {ξ ∈ Rq| ξ = (BK(x, t)− I)x− w,
K(x, t) ∈ co{K(i)}i∈I , w ∈ W},307
for assigned polytopic sets co{K(i)}i∈I , and ellipsoidal set W, and where B(t) is a308
Brownian motion weighted by a matrix Σ and B defined as in (10).309
The stability, well-posedness and existence of solution to (15), when saturated310
linear controllers are used has been studied in Hu et al. (2006); Cai et al. (2009); Hu311
et al. (2005); Jokic et al. (2008); Grammatico et al. (2014).312
For any symmetric positive definite matrix P ∈ Rn×n, define the function V (x) =313
xTPx and the ellipsoidal target set Π = {x ∈ Rn : V (x) ≤ 1}. We are interested in314
studying convergence of the solutions of (15) to the target set.315
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5. Examples. The stochastic differential inclusion (15) arises in the case of sat-316
urated controls, and in the case of two-population games. We discuss next these three317
examples.318
5.1. Example 1: saturated controls. Assume that controls are bounded319
within polytopes320
(17) u(t) ∈ U = {u ∈ R(q−1)+n : u− ≤ u ≤ u+},321
where u+, u− are assigned vectors. Note that we can assume the characteristic func-322
tion centred at zero as in (12) as we can always center the hypercube of u(t) around323
any desired value.324
In addition, for any matrix K ∈ Rn+(q−1)×q, define as saturated linear state325
feedback control any policy326
(18) u = −sat{Kx} =
{ −Kx if Kx ∈ U
u(x) ∈ ∂U otherwise,327
where ∂U indicates the frontier of set U .328
In the above, the sat{.} operator has to be interpreted component-wise, namely329




where Ki• denotes the ith row of K and where, for any given scalar a and b
sat[a,b]{ζ} =
 b, if ζ > b,ζ, if a ≤ ζ ≤ b,
a, if ζ < a.
Henceforth we omit the indices of the sat function.331
Under the control u = sat{−Kx}, the closed-loop dynamics mimics the differen-332
tial inclusion (15) as follows333
dx ∈ {(−x+Bsat{−Kx} − w)dt+ ΣdB(t), w ∈ W}.334
5.2. Example 2: distribution network. Consider a distribution network335
problem where there is a demand for a specific commodity and the reward for sup-336
plying it is suitably described by our control law. When the demands are based on a337
diffusion process, their evolution can be written as:338
(20) d˙ = w(t)−
∑
dB(t).339
Then (13) can be written with respect to d˙ as:
dη(t) = [w0(t) + d˙(t) + ΣdB(t)]dt− ΣdB(t).
The excess then can be written as340
(21) dx(t) = (−x(t) +BHu(t))dt− dη(t),341
where u is the control vector as defined in (18).342
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u(j)\w(k) w(1) · · · w(q˜)




u(p˜) Bu(p˜) − w(1) · · · Bu(p˜) − w(q˜)
Table 1
The possible vector payoffs.
5.3. Example 3: approachability. Equation (15) is in the same spirit as in343
Hart and Mas-Colell’s paper (Hart and Mas-Colell, 2003) on continuous-time ap-344
proachability.345
In particular (15), can be obtained when a 2-player repeated game with vector
payoffs as displayed in Table 1, is considered. Let A1 = {u(1), . . . , u(p˜)} and A1 =
{w(1), . . . , w(q˜)} be the actions sets of player 1 and 2. Denote a1 = [a11, . . . , a1p˜]T and
a2 = [a21, . . . , a2q˜]
T the mixed strategies of player 1 and 2, respectively. Introduce

















(Bu− w) dτ ∈ Rq.347
If we rescale the time window using s = et, take x(t) = Γ(et) and differentiate with
respect to t, we obtain the differential equation (15). Note that, after rescaling the




(Bu− w) dτ ∈ Rq.
Adopting a “population-game dynamics” perspective, the state x(t) ∈ Rq repre-348
sents the current average payoff over the population.349
6. Main results. In this section it is shown that the second moment of the350
deviations from the core, x(t), is bounded, when a saturated linear feedback controller351
is used. This is achieved by the use of polytopic techniques (Mayne , 2003). Polytopic352
constraints are widely used in order to model problems related to robust control353
problems when the transition matrix of the process is state-dependent, i.e. x˙ = A(x)x.354
In addition, because no further constraints have been imposed on (15), the proposed355
methodology can be used to control dynamic TU games when (15) describes the356
dynamics of the game.357
Our idea is to rewrite the above dynamics in the following polytopic form358
(22) dx ∈ {(BK(x, t)− I)x(t)− w(t)dt+ ΣdB(t), w ∈ W},359
where the time varying matrices K(x, t) are expressed as convex combinations of360
|I| matrices K(i), i ∈ I. More precisely the expressions for K(x, t) are361







σ˜i(x, t) = 1.362
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The control policy is then







σ˜i(x, t) = 1.
In the case of saturated controls the procedure to derive the weights in the above363
control policy are discussed in (Gomes da Silva, 2001).364
Theorem 6.1. The distance of any solution of the stochastic differential inclu-365
sion (15) from the target set Π is second-moment bounded if for all x ∈ Xj, j ∈ I366
(24) xT
[






where Ψ(i) = [BK(i) − I] and Xj is any subspace where K(i) is in the support Sj of
K, i.e., the control is







σ˜i(x, t) = 1.
Proof. The analysis is then performed within the framework of stochastic stability368










and the Lyapunov function V (x) = xTPx. The stochastic derivative of V (x) is371
obtained by applying (25) to V (x), which yields372
LV (x(t)) = lim
dt→0

















Σ2ii(x)(∇2xx[V (x)])ii + [BK(·)x− x− w]T ·375
·∇x[V (x)] +∇x[V (x)]T [BK(·)x− x− w].376
Using ∇2xx[V (x)] = P and ∇x[V (x)] = Px the above can be rewritten as follows, for377
all x 6∈ Π, and w ∈ W378
(26)
LV (x) = [−x+BK(x, t)x− w]TPx
+xTP [−x+BK(x, t)x− w] +∑qi=1 Σ2ii(x)Pii
= xT [BK(x, t)− I]TPx+ xTP [BK(x, t)− I]x
−wTPx− xTPw +∑qi=1 Σ2iiPii < 0.
379
Let Π = Rq \ Π. From the S-procedure, we know that for all x ∈ Π, and w ∈ W380
condition (26) holds if there exist α, β ≥ 0, such that for all (x,w) ∈ Π×W381
(27)
LV (x) = xT [BK(x, t)− I]TPx
+xTP [BK(x, t)− I]x
−wTPx− xTPw +∑qi=1 Σ2iiPii
≤ α(1− V (x)) + β(‖w‖2R − 1) ≤ 0.
382
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The last inequality is obtained from observing that
Π×W := {(ξ, ω) : 1− V (ξ) ≤ 0, ‖ω‖2R − 1 ≤ 0}.










−α+ β +∑qi=1 Σ2iiPii ≤ 0.384




1 Recall that α and β can be chosen arbitrarily. After pre and post-386











Now, as the state never leaves the region S(ψθ), i.e., x(t) ∈ S(ψθ), we can always389
express A(x(t)) as a convex combination of the Ajs as in (23).390













where Ψ(i) = [BK(i) − I]. Using the Shur complement condition (28) is implied393
by (24).394
Based on the above stated theorem we can infer that the solution of a dynamic TU395
game when (15) is used will lie in the -core. This is because even if the disturbance396
in 13 is a q-dimensional unbounded Brownian motion, the dynamics of the process397
are bounded in the second moment.398
Stronger conditions are established in the following corollary.399
Corollary 6.2. The distance of any solution of the stochastic differential inclu-400
sion (15) from the target set Π is second-moment bounded, if there exists a scalar401
α ≥ 0 such that, for all K(i), i ∈ I402
(29) Q[BK(i) − I]T + [BK(i) − I]Q+ αQ+ 1
β
R−1 < 0.403
Proof. Straightforward from observing that (29) implies (24).404
Note that conditions (24) simply impose that each one of the conditions (29) (for405
fixed j) holds only in a specific region of the state space and not over the entire Rn.406
In this sense, condition (24) is weaker than (29).407
Let d(x,Π) be the distance of any given x ∈ Rq from the target set Π. Consider408
a modified stochastic differential inclusion409
(30) dx(t) ∈ F (x)dt+ Σ(x)dB(t),410
where Σ(x) is the weight of the random noise which is now upper bounded by the411
distance of x from the target set, i.e., Σ(x) ≤ d(x,Π). We are in a position to412
establish the next result relating to the case where the variance of the stochastic413
process vanishes the closer the trajectory is to the target set.414
1Pii is not known a priori so we need to implement a guess method
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Corollary 6.3. Let Σ(x) ≤ d(x,Π) and let Ψ(i) = [BK(i) − I]. Any solution of415
the stochastic differential inclusion (30) converges to the target set Π almost surely if416
for all x ∈ Xi, i ∈ I417
(31) xT
[












+xTP [−x+BK(x, t)x− w] +∑qi=1 Σ2ii(x)Pii}
= xT [BK(x, t)− I]TPx+ xTP [BK(x, t)− I]x
−wTPx− xTPw < 0.
420
We then look for α, β ≥ 0, such that for all (x,w) ∈ Π×W421
(33)
LV (x) = xT [BK(x, t)− I]TPx
+xTP [BK(x, t)− I]x
−wTPx− xTPw
≤ α(1− V (x)) + β(‖w‖2R − 1) ≤ 0,
422










−α+ β ≤ 0.
424
After pre and post-multiplying by Q = P−1, and using convexity, the above condition425
leads to (28), and this concludes the proof.426
Let B(t) be a zero-mean random noise such that ∫ dB(t) has bounded support.427
For instance, think of
∫
dB(t) as a truncated Gaussian noise with bounded support428
in the interval [−κ¯σ, κ¯σ] for a positive scalar κ¯. The counterpart of (15) is then429
(34) dx(t) ∈ F (x)dt+ ΣdB(t).430
Assume B(t) ∈ [−Σ,Σ] and let W˜ := {ω : ω = w + σ˜, w ∈ W, σ˜ ∈ [−Σ,Σ]}. Also, let
R˜ be such that
W˜ ⊆ W¯ := {ω : ‖ω‖2
R˜
− 1 ≤ 0}.
We are in a position to state the following main result.431
Theorem 6.4. Any solution of the stochastic differential inclusion (15) converges432
to the target set Π if for all for all K(i), i ∈ I433
(35)
[










[−x+BK(x, t)x− w ± Σ]TPx




xT [BK(x, t)− I]TPx+ xTP [BK(x, t)− I]x
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Recall that W˜ := {ω : ω = w + σ˜, w ∈ W, σ˜ ∈ [−Σ,Σ]}. From the above we have437
that for all x 6∈ Π it must hold438
(37)
V˙ (x) ≤ maxω∈W˜{





For all x ∈ Π, and ω ∈ W˜ the above condition holds if there exist α, β ≥ 0, such that440
for all (x,w) ∈ Π×W441
(38)
V˙ (x) = xT [BK(x, t)− I]TPx
+xTP [BK(x, t)− I]x
−ωTPx− xTPω
≤ α(1− V (x)) + β(‖w‖2R − 1) ≤ 0.
442
From the definition of R˜ it holds
W˜ ⊆ W¯ := {ω : ‖ω‖2
R˜
− 1 ≤ 0}.
For all (x,w) in
Π× W¯ := {(ξ, ω) : 1− V (ξ) ≤ 0, ‖ω‖2
R˜
− 1 ≤ 0},













and this concludes our proof.445
7. Intelligent Mobility Network. In this section the stability analysis of the446
case study of the intelligent mobility network of Section 3 is presented.447
Initially the deterministic version of dynamics (15) is decomposed as448
(40)
dx(t) ∈ {(−x(t) +Bu(t)− w˜(t))dt
+ΣdB(t), w˜(t) ∈ W˜},449
where w˜(t) is an uncertain but bounded deviation from the expected profit, given by450
(41)
w˜(t) = [PS(y,Θ∗S)− EPS(y,Θ∗S)]S∈S
∈W (2) := {w ∈ Rm| δ ≤ w ≤ δ}.451
In the above expression δ and δ are upper and lower bounds respectively, and are452
obtained as453
δ := PS(DS ,Θ∗S)− EPS(y,Θ∗S),(42)454
δ := PS(DS ,Θ∗S)− EPS(y,Θ∗S).(43)455
Before we calculate δ
j
and δj , note that to derive (40), we simply write the real456
profit as combination of expected profit w0(t) and deviation from the expected profit457
w˜(t), namely w(t) = w0(t) + w˜(t). The expected profit is a priori known and given458
by w0(t) = [〈PS(DS ,Θ∗S)〉]S∈S .We can then design a first control input u0(t) based459
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on the Shapley allocation to compensate the optimal expected profit. To do this, let460
u0(t) be obtained from the following equation:461
(44) Bu0(t) = w0(t) = [ESJ(y,Θ∗S)]S∈S .462
To obtain an expression for δ
j
let us maximize the profit of the corresponding463
coalition S with respect to y, namely464
DS := arg maxDS PS(DS ,Θ∗S)
= arg maxDS{pµ− cΘ∗S − smax(0,Θ∗S −DS)
−(p+ h) max(0, DS −Θ∗S)} = Θ∗S .
465
Then, the maximal profit for coalition S is
max
y
PS(y,Θ∗S) = PS(DS ,Θ∗S) = PS(Θ∗S ,Θ∗S) = pµ− cΘ∗S .
Substituting the above in (42), we have
δ
j
:= pµ− cΘ∗S − 〈PS(DS ,Θ∗S)〉.
Similarly, to obtain δj used in (43), let us minimize the profit of the corresponding466
coalition S with respect to y, namely467
DS := arg minDS PS(DS ,Θ∗S)
= arg minDS{pµ− cΘ∗S − smax(0,Θ∗S −DS)
−(p+ h) max(0, DS −Θ∗S)} = 0.
468




PS(y,Θ∗S) = PS(DS ,Θ∗S) = PS(0,Θ∗S) = pµ− (s+ c)Θ∗S .
Substituting the above in (43), we have
δj := pµ− (s+ c)Θ∗S − 〈PS(DS ,Θ∗S)〉.
We can conclude that469
w˜(t) ∈ W˜ := {w ∈ Rm|
[pµ− (s+ c)Θ∗S − 〈PS(DS ,Θ∗S)〉]S∈S} ≤ w
≤ [pµ− cΘ∗S − 〈PS(DS ,Θ∗S)〉]S∈S}.
470
As last step we define the parametrized ellipsoid
Πk = {ω ∈ Rm : k2ωTΦω ≤ 1},
where Φ is a matrix in Rm×m and consider the problem of finding the smallest ellipsoid




The dynamic model we obtain is then471
dx(t) ∈ {(−x(t) +Bu(t)− ω)dt+ ΣdB(t), ω ∈ Πk∗},472
which is of the same form as in (15).473
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8. Simulations. An application of the multi-inventory coalitional model, which474
was described in the previous section, can be found in the electricity trade market.475
Consider the case of n electricity producers which should meet the electricity demands476
of a central distributor. The expected profit of a generic coalition is described by (2)477
under the following two assumptions (Baeyens et al., 2013):478
• The structure of the network does not affect the prices and the demand of479
electricity.480
• The electricity market system comprises of a single ex-ante forward penalty481
and a single ex-post imbalance penalty for variations from the contracted482
values.483
The dynamic demand of such system can be defined as the diffusion process of484
(20) and the excess is defined as in (21). In the simulations of this section a saturated485
controller of the form of (18) is used here K = kB−1 and k = 23 . In our simulations486
we consider the case of four players/energy producers that should decide if they will487
be part of a coalition and share the costs and profits from energy production. The488
initial demand was set to [0.1693 0.2019 0.1304 0.0562]T . The drift parameter489
w was bounded in wTRw ≤ 1 and R was set to be the identity matrix. Figures 2-4490
depict the evolution of the excess, the variance of the excess and the Shapley value491
respectively.492
As it is evident from Figure 2 the excess is always non-negative for all the coalitions493
which is an indication of a non-empty core. In addition the excess is grouped according494
to the number of the coalition’s members. In particular, the excess for the coalitions495
with one member have greater excess than the coalitions with two members and496
the coalitions with two members have greater excess than the coalitions with three497
members. The grand coalition has excess near to zero.498
Figure 3 depicts the variance of the excess of all possible coalitions. As it can be499
seen from Figure 3 the variances of all coalitions converge to a constant value smaller500
than one.501
Figure 4 depicts the Shapley’s value for all players over time. Since the excess502
value is always positive we can conclude that the core is non-empty.503
9. Conclusion. The problem of controlling the allocations in dynamic TU games504
is considered. Stochastic differential inclusions are used to model the uncertainty of505
dynamic TU games, which can be occurred either as a result of a dynamic environ-506
ment or noisy observations. A model is proposed, which extends the results of Bauso507
et al. (2010) that allows allocation to be controlled by taking into account the de-508
terministic and stochastic uncertainty which exists in the evolution of the excess of509
a coalition. In particular based on linear matrix inequality conditions it is shown510
that the stochastic differential inclusion solutions are second-moment bounded. An511
intelligent mobility scenario is used to show the applicability of the proposed method-512
ology. Additionally simulations in a distribution network are employed which support513
the theoretical results, by showing stability of the core and bounded variance of the514
coalitions’ excesses.515
Future work could include a distributed version of the proposed model. This will516
increase the efficiency of the proposed methodology’s applicability in scenarios which517
include thousand of players. In addition the performance of the proposed methodology518
and limitation which may arise from the usage of real distribution network’s data in519
the simulations will be considered.520
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